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The False Panacea of International Agreements for
U.S. Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds
David A. Hall*
I. INTRODUCTION
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) pose a unique threat to the
United States. Unlike other investment vehicles used solely to
maximize returns, SWFs may invest for political objectives or
strategic resource procurement, both of which are potentially
harmful to U.S. interests. Countries such as China, Russia, and Saudi
Arabia all have SWFs currently in operation in the United States, and
the number of countries following this trend continues to rise.1
Despite the economic and national security risks that SWFs pose
to the United States, political institutions have largely ignored these
investment vehicles, allowing them to move freely within the
financial sector. Ironically, in 2006, politicians blocked the purchase
of a U.S. port management company by a foreign state-owned
company.2 Such action seems inconsistent considering the arguably
more sensitive nature of the U.S. financial sector; after all, if the
government is concerned about the security of our ports, why not be
equally concerned with the security of our economy?3
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman,
Christopher Cox, stated that the rise of SWFs poses a challenge to
regulators, implying a need to regulate SWFs.4 Solving this regulatory
* J.D. candidate, Washington College of Law, American University (2009). The author
thanks his advisor, Professor V. Gerard Comizio.
1. See Appendix A.
2. The failed takeover of a U.S. company by a foreign state-owned company illustrates
the heterogeneous views of foreign governments investing in U.S. assets. See EDWARD M.
GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT 136–43 (2006) (describing the politicization of the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States’ (CFIUS) review of the proposed title transfer of Peninsular
and Oriental Steam Navigation Company to Dubai Ports World, which is owned by the
United Arab Emirates).
3. See Robin Sidel, Abu Dhabi to Bolster Citigroup with $7.5 Billion Capital Infusion,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2007, at A3 (explaining that the Abu Dhabi investment authority does
not have special ownership rights or a role in the management of Citigroup).
4. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Keynote Address and Robert R. Glauber
Lecture at the John F. Kennedy School of Government: The Role of Government in Markets
(Oct. 24, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407cc.htm
(questioning the role of government investment funds in a public market as contrary to the
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challenge is difficult, even with the existing international agreements
signed or implemented by the United States because SWFs are
investors and U.S. regulators generally do not regulate investors.5
Despite the increase in SWFs, many questions on how to regulate
them remain unanswered by the extant literature. In particular,
current works have failed to consider the legal issues surrounding
regulation through international agreements, and the necessary
modifications to increase the effectiveness of such agreements. This
Comment argues that the legal and regulatory framework under
currently applicable international agreements fails to effectively
regulate SWFs and offers recommendations to modify and enhance
the existing framework.
Part II defines SWFs, discusses the current state of SWF
regulation by the United States, and introduces the defenses
available and applicable jurisdictional bars to SWFs in the U.S.
judicial system. Additionally, it examines the various international
agreements that potentially affect U.S. regulation of SWFs and
several of the risks posed by SWFs.
Part III demonstrates the infeasibility of sovereign action
jurisdictional bars in U.S. courts. This Part then determines that the
U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and the International
Organization of Securities Commissions Multilateral Memorandum
of Understanding (IOSCO MOU) will not allow the SEC to
effectively force disclosures from SWFs. Part III also examines the
potential for indirect regulation of SWFs through financial
intermediaries under the Basel II Accord and ultimately concludes
that it offers minimal relief. Finally, Part III finds the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement’s role in regulating
SWFs negligible at best.6
In Part IV, this Comment offers recommendations for the U.S.
Model Investment Treaty, the capital adequacy requirements of the
Basel II Accord, and specific changes for the IMF Articles of
regulatory philosophy of the United States).
5. See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing the regulatory approach to SWFs and the
exceptions to a lack of regulation of investor behavior).
6. See discussion infra Part III.C (arguing that the IMF Articles of Agreement do not
provide an effective means of forcing disclosures from SWFs because they are focused on
exchange rates and utilizing the Special Drawing Right (SDR) as the principal asset for reserve
holdings); cf. DENNIS R. APPLEYARD ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 725 (5th ed.
2006) (revealing that some refer to the SDR as “paper gold” because the IMF created the
reserve assets “out of thin air”). The IMF utilizes a basket of currencies to determine the value
of the SDR. Id.
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Agreement. Ultimately, international agreements provide inadequate
support for potential U.S. regulation of SWFs.
II. LEGAL AND REGULATORY CONTEXT
SWFs raise fundamental questions about whether the United
States is willing to regulate investor activity and how such regulation
would be carried out under international agreements.7 Moreover,
they pose unique challenges to U.S. financial regulators who depend
on foreign regulators for information about foreign violators of U.S.
securities laws.8 Even after regulators have sufficient information to
bring a claim against a noncompliant SWF, they must still overcome
jurisdictional bars SWFs may raise to quash regulatory proceedings in
a U.S. court.9
Any discussion of SWFs must be framed within the legal and
regulatory context in which they operate. That context includes the
following international agreements signed by the United States:
numerous bilateral agreements to promote and protect investment,10
a multilateral information sharing agreement to better prosecute
trans-border securities law violators,11 and agreements to protect the
stability of the international financial system.12
By way of background, this Part briefly introduces SWFs and

7. See
2004
U.S.
Model
Bilateral
Investment
Treaty,
art.
3,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT]
(providing for national treatment of foreign investors, which potentially implicates a regulatory
scheme that singles out SWFs).
8. See generally Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns [IOSCO], Multilateral Memorandum of
Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information
(May 2002), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD126.pdf
[hereinafter IOSCO MOU] (revealing the need for international cooperation for the
enforcement of securities laws).
9. See Philip J. Power, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and its
Implications for Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701, 2727–41 (1996) (offering
the application of jurisdictional bars in the sovereign debt context, which an SWF could
utilize).
10. See Appendix C.
11. See IOSCO MOU, supra note 8.
12. Federal Reserve Board, Joint Final Rule and Supporting Board Documents: RiskBased Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework—Basel II, 7 (Nov. 2, 2007),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/GeneralInfo/basel2/FinalRule_BaselII/
FinalRule_Draft.pdf. [hereinafter U.S. Final Rule] (implementing the Advanced Capital
Adequacy Framework in the United States); Second Amendment of Articles of Agreement of
the International Monetary Fund, art. VIII, Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No
8937, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa.pdf [hereinafter IMF
Articles].

139

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 5

discusses the risks they pose to the U.S. financial system, the current
U.S. regulatory approach, and the sovereign immunity of SWFs and
potential jurisdictional bars to claims against SWFs. This Part also
examines international agreements that protect investors and the
global financial network.
A. Risks Posed by Sovereign Wealth Funds to the U.S. Financial System
An SWF may present risks to the U.S. financial system in four
main areas: (1) direct investment in U.S. publicly traded companies,
(2) investment through alternative investment vehicles such as hedge
funds and private equity groups, (3) the use of financial
intermediaries to utilize modern finance techniques, and (4) the
issuance of securities through a corporation it controls.13 While not
necessarily discrete categories,14 they serve as a useful framework for
understanding the challenges facing U.S. regulators. Keeping these
fluid risk categories in mind, the opacity of SWFs leads to concerns
about the motivation and purpose of their investments. Politicians
and investors alike may question whether an SWF is investing for
“economic returns, political objectives, [or] securing strategic
resources.”15 As evidenced by the failed deal between the China
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Unocal,16
political considerations play into the concerns of regulators and the
politicians who appoint them.17
Calls by SEC Chairman Cox for the regulation of SWFs
demonstrate political concern over the current securities regulations,

13. For specific examples of SWFs from many different countries operating in these areas
of the U.S. financial system, see generally MARTIN A. WEISS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS
(2008).
14. For instance, a Chinese SWF’s purchase of a less than ten percent stake in
Blackstone, a U.S. private equity firm, demonstrates the fluidity of the categories because it
represents the direct purchase of a U.S. company that also serves as an alternative investment
manager. See Blackstone Group, L.P., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 4 (June 11,
2007).
15. See The World’s Most Expensive Club, ECONOMIST, May 26, 2007, at 79 (arguing
that the Chinese purchase of a stake in Blackstone could be understood as a political maneuver
in response to growing protectionist sentiment).
16. See GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 2, at 128–36 (contending that the attempt
of CNOOC to purchase the U.S. oil company Unocal and the subsequent prevention by the
United States Congress utilizing the CFIUS process was motivated by a political “perfect
storm,” which included nearly record high oil prices, strong anti-Chinese sentiment, and
Chevron’s attempt to purchase the company).
17. See The World’s Most Expensive Club, supra note 15.
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which present little challenge to the operation of SWFs in the United
States.18 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) requires
an SWF to provide notice if it acquires beneficial ownership of more
than five percent of a U.S. regulated company.19 This requirement
leads to information disclosure, but not necessarily to regulation of
the SWF.20 SWFs face additional reporting requirements and activity
restrictions if they acquire more than ten percent of a U.S. regulated
company.21
Restrictions on SWFs that may benefit owners of U.S. regulated
companies involve the purchase and sale of shares, but these
provisions do not solve the problem of enforcing regulation across
borders.22 Additionally, SWFs could leverage their position as
insiders in their home countries to purchase securities before they are
offered to the general public, and then resell them to U.S. investors
through a financial intermediary or on the over-the-counter (OTC)
market.23 Finally, SWFs may expose themselves to liability by selling
unregistered securities to U.S. investors through companies they
control.24 These regulatory provisions lack teeth because of the
inability to enforce them.

18. See WEISS, supra note 13, at 8 (noting Blackstone CEO Steve Schwarzman’s
statement concerning the Chinese SWF purchase of a less than ten percent stake in that
company as not needing government approval).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d).
20. Id. (requiring the disclosure of information by those owning more than five percent
of a U.S. regulated company). See also Simon Johnson, The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds,
44:3 FIN. & DEV. (International Monetary Fund Sept. 2007) available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/index.htm.
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m–n.
22. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78n (creating a U.S. restriction on beneficial owner activities,
but not providing a cross-border mechanism to enforce it), with IOSCO MOU, supra note 8,
§ 6 (acknowledging the ineffectiveness of cross-border enforcement without foreign regulator
cooperation).
23. See 17 C.F.R. §230.501–506 (2008) (stipulating restrictions for the resale of
restricted securities to unaccredited investors). It is also possible that foreign issuers besides
SWFs could take advantage of insider trading due to lax foreign regulation.
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (prohibiting the sale or delivery of unregistered securities
through the means of interstate commerce); see also WEISS, supra note 13, at 8 (detailing the
investments of the Chinese SWF, including its purchase of an investment company from a
Chinese bank, demonstrating how SWFs could potentially purchase entire companies should it
suit their investment objectives).
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B. Introduction to Sovereign Wealth Funds -- Old Players with New
Names and Modern Techniques
SWFs control large amounts of capital invested in the United
States and are reluctant to disclose investment information.25 SWFs
with different mandates and motivations for investing pose risks
different from those posed by other market participants, including
hedge funds and institutional investors.26 The subsections below
offer a general overview of the purposes of SWFs and their operation
in the financial system.
1. General overview of sovereign wealth funds
SWFs are not a new phenomenon,27 but they have recently
garnered more attention.28 They are government-owned investment
vehicles that invest in a country’s reserve assets.29 More specifically,
25. Cf. Stuart E. Eizenstat & Alan Larson, The Sovereign Wealth Fund Explosion, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 1, 2007, at A19 (arguing that SWFs should disclose financial results and make
clear that maximizing financial return drives investment decisions).
26. See id. (noting that pension funds, one kind of institutional investor, invest on
behalf of pensioners while SWFs may invest to control strategic resources or bolster national
companies).
27. SWFs have been around since at least the middle of the 20th century; there is
disagreement, however, as to the precise moment of origination. Compare Philipp M.
Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman, Swiss Nat’l Bank, Speech at the Int’l Ctr. For Monetary and
Banking Studies: The Challenge of Sovereign Wealth Funds (Dec. 18, 2007) (positing that the
first SWF began in 1816 when the government of France set up Caisse des Dépots), with The
World’s Most Expensive Club, supra note 15 (stating that SWFs probably began inadvertently in
1956 with the Gilbert Islands and the British administration of Micronesia).
28. See Johnson, supra note 20. Johnson puts this figure in the context of U.S. GDP,
which is $12 trillion per year, and the total value of traded securities, which is approximately
$50 trillion. Compare id. (arriving at a $10 trillion estimate for assets controlled by SWFs in
2012), with Cox, supra note 4 (proposing SWFs could control $12 trillion by 2015); see also
Johnson, supra note 20 (arguing the divergence in figures is not surprising as there is a “dearth
of information” with respect to SWFs); see generally Bob Davis, How Trade Talks Could Tame
Sovereign-Wealth Funds, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2007, at A2 (analyzing the possibility of making
SWF regulation a new topic for global trade talks); see generally Eizenstat & Larson, supra note
25 (discussing political concerns over SWFs which stem from the increasing amounts under the
control of SWFs and the politically sensitive locations of some of the new SWFs being set up).
29. Cf. APPLEYARD ET AL., supra note 6, at 736 (noting the falling overall value of
reserves relative to imports in the international financial system, but explaining that excess
reserves result from exchange rate intervention). Reserves are a country’s foreign exchange
assets that accrue due to a trade surplus or undervalued exchange rate. Id. A country like China
has a trade surplus with the United States, which means it exports more goods to the United
States than it imports. Id. The revenue from exports brings more money into the country than
leaves the country in terms of spending on imports. Id. In this example, if this trade imbalance
persists, then the net exporting country builds up surplus dollars. Id. The Chinese state builds
up these assets because it exchanges Chinese yuan with citizens who receive dollars in exchange
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SWFs invest excess reserves30 in assets denominated in another
country’s currency.31 In theory, the goal of SWFs is the long-term
investment of excess reserves, while maximizing investment returns.32
SWFs differ from institutional investors like pension funds in that
they generally have no explicit liabilities.33 A pension fund’s liabilities
are the payments it must eventually make to its investors, at a greater
sum than that originally received.34
An SWF is an entity separate35 from a country’s central bank.36
for the goods they exported. Id.
30. See Em Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 468 (2nd Cir. 2007)
(describing an Argentine decree concerning excess reserves in a sovereign debt dispute). Excess
reserves can also be understood as the amount of reserves in excess of what a country needs to
cover its monetary base. Id. See also Johnson, supra note 20 (stating that “extra” reserves are
those in excess of what a country feels are necessary for “immediate purposes”); A
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING 140 (John Smullen & Nicholas Hand eds., 3d. ed.
Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (declaring that excess reserves are undesirable and result from poor
loan demand or high interest rates). Although countries differ in how they define their
monetary base, they generally include some combination of money in circulation and demand
deposits held by the central bank for financial institutions. Id. at 267–69.
31. See Hildebrand, supra note 27 (laying out the general approach of SWF investment
choices, which tends toward foreign assets).
32. See Belinda Cao, China’s $200 Billion Sovereign Fund Begins Operations (Update 1),
BLOOMBERG,
Sept.
29,
2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aGy8fzTT25.w (reporting the statements of various Chinese
officials involved with the creation of its SWF including that the SWF would keep tolerable
risks in mind while investing).
33. See Hildebrand, supra note 27 (explaining that SWFs can act in a manner unfamiliar
to regulators because they are not required to make specific payments, such as pension funds
that pay pensioners at a delineated time); see also Edwin M. Truman, Sovereign Wealth Funds:
The Need for Greater Transparency and Accountability, Policy Brief Number PB 07–6, 9
(Institute for International Economics, Aug. 2007) (positing that the idea that because SWFs
have no explicit liabilities, they may resist pulling out of markets when there are economic
downturns and help stabilize the international financial system). Truman questions the role
SWFs will ultimately play in the international financial system. Id. But see WEISS, supra note 13
(noting that the Chinese SWF must service a debt load of $40 million per day).
34. See Hildebrand, supra note 27, at 2 (arguing that this is a critical difference between
SWFs and pension funds).
35. See First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 628 (1983) (holding “the presumption that a foreign government’s determination that
its instrumentality is to be accorded separate legal status is buttressed by” the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act); see also ROGNVALDUR HANNESSON, INVESTING FOR
SUSTAINABILITY: THE MANAGEMENT OF MINERAL WEALTH 42 (2001)
(questioning the ultimate autonomy of an SWF in a democratic society because institutions are
accountable to politicians and politicians are ultimately accountable to the populace, but
stating that it should nonetheless be set up as an autonomous institution). SWF autonomy in a
non-democratic society remains unclear, as the causal link between the institution and the
populace is more tenuous than in a democratic society. Id.
36. See Ewart S. Williams, Governor, Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, Feature
Address to the South Trinidad Chamber of Commerce Annual General Meeting:
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The primary objective of an SWF is to maximize the risk/return
equation (r/r equation).37 A central bank’s primary objective is to
eliminate risk with little concern for the return on the investment.38
In addition, because SWFs have a longer investment time horizon,
they can diversify away from short-term liquid asset classes and invest
in long-term illiquid asset classes.39
Understanding the Heritage and Stabilization Fund, 1–2 (Sept. 20, 2007) available at
http://www.bis.org/review/r071004d.pdf (elucidating that central banks hold reserves for
prudential purposes and have liquidity as their chief consideration). Prudential concerns dictate
that central banks invest in order to maintain the stability of the financial system under their
care, and the implication of this concern is to focus on high liquidity when choosing its asset
allocation strategy, i.e., central banks invest primarily in short to medium-term low-risk assets
that are highly fungible with cash. Id. See also A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING,
supra note 30, at 330 (stating that banks with prudential concerns exercise an added degree of
caution beyond covering their monetary base). Liquidity means the degree to which a bank can
quickly exchange its assets for cash, or the financial system regards its assets as fungible with
another currency. Id. at 239–40. Thus, high liquidity means that a bank can easily exchange its
assets for cash, which is important in a financial crisis when the central bank needs to sure up
the banking system by giving cash to banks. Id. Asset allocation is how a bank decides to
allocate its capital between high and low liquid assets. Id.
37. See generally Investing Concepts: Investing Basics, The Motley Fool,
http://www.fool.com/school/basics/basics02.htm (giving a basic definition of investment
terms, which serve to illuminate the choice between risk and return leading to the implication
that there is some restriction on SWF activity). The risk/return equation represents the
essential choice that investors face; that is, whether they want more security in an investment
with a lower rate of return, or a higher return and less security. Id. This choice is illustrated by
the difference between securities, where there is the potential to lose all of the investment, but
there is the possibility for tremendous appreciation, and relatively risk-free 3-month U.S.
Treasury Bills that offer a lower rate of return. Id.
38. See Williams, supra note 36, at 3–4 (stating that nature or source of a country’s
excess reserves may dictate how an SWF maximizes the r/r equation). The Trinidad and
Tobago SWF would not invest in assets directly related to oil and gas because this is the source
of Trinidad and Tobago’s excess reserves. Id. SWFs can maximize the r/r equation by shifting
away from liquidity as their primary objective and investing in assets that produce a higher
return, but are less liquid. Id. See also HANNESSON, supra note 35, at 40–43 (arguing that
before a government sets up an SWF it must make a basic choice between investing in
infrastructure, health, and education, or choosing to invest “in projects that are profitable on
the basis of conventional market criteria”). Countries seek to provide funds as opposed to
other investments for future generations. This allows future generations to spend the money as
they see fit. Id. Cf. Keith Bradsher, China Faces Backlash at Home Over Blackstone Investment,
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 2, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/08/
02/opinion/backlash.php (quoting one anonymous Chinese blogger who admonishes the
government stating that “[t]he foreign reserves are the product of the sweat and blood of the
people of China, please invest them with more care!”).
39. See Y. V. Reddy, Governor, Reserve Bank of India, Address at the Golden Jubilee
Celebrations of the Foreign Exchange Dealers’ Association of India: Forex Reserves,
Stabilization Funds and Sovereign Wealth Funds – Indian Perspective, 1 (Oct. 8, 2007) in BIS
Review, Nov. 3, 2007 available at http://www.bis.org/review/r071009b.pdf (explaining
that a central bank’s goal is to have sufficient reserves to cover its monetary base, whereas,
SWFs are seeking a return higher than is necessary to preserve the real value of their reserves),
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2. Fiduciary duty and modern financial techniques
Governments employ a series of techniques to circumvent
potential conflicts of central bankers’ interests. A central banker has
the fiduciary duty to operate funds in the best interest of her country
and would violate that duty if she allowed ever-increasing reserves to
reside in low-yielding liquid assets.40 Therefore, the government sets
up a separate entity with different reserve management objectives,
and the fiduciary duty to manage the reserves in the best interests of
the country remains.41 In order to meet this fiduciary duty while
maximizing the r/r equation, SWFs engage in many of the modern
finance techniques that allow them to hedge some of their risk.42
and Bradsher, supra note 38 (discussing that SWFs are still beholden to the public and must
answer for poor investment decisions). The Chinese public expressed concern over unrealized
losses by the Chinese SWF in its investment in the U.S. private equity firm Blackstone, and the
speedy nature of the decision to invest in the U.S. alternative asset manager. Id. See also
Williams, supra note 36 (explaining that to avoid contagion with potential domestic economic
troubles, some SWFs limit their possible investment choices strictly to foreign investments).
This concern leads to the strict prohibition against domestic investments by the Trinidad and
Tobago SWF. Id.
40. See The World’s Most Expensive Club, supra note 15 (showing the question becomes
more pertinent as reserves mushroom because of the opportunity cost associated with unspent
funds).
41. See HANNESSON, supra note 35, at 42–43 (arguing that there is an opportunity cost
to creating an SWF with forgoing fiscal spending as the main downside cost, which raises the
question of whether spending domestically, or saving in foreign assets is in the best interests of
the country); see also Bradsher, supra note 38 (noting that the public may take a different view
over how to invest a country’s excess reserves).
42. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION
677–78 (Aspen L. & Bus. 2001) (discussing the reasoning behind modern day investment
techniques and offering a compelling reason why any financial market participant would utilize
derivatives and futures investing tools). Loss and Seligman state that according to the efficient
market hypothesis, which is a theory that the market will disseminate information broadly to all
market participants, investors cannot out-trade each other because of superior information. Id.
Investors then rely on portfolio theory, where they divide the risk in the portfolio into firm
specific risk (“alpha”) and overall market risk (“beta”). Id. The diversification of assets virtually
eliminates alpha risk, and investors manage beta risk according to their individual r/r equation,
or asset allocation strategy. Id. Presently, some investors attempt to limit their beta risk by
engaging in futures and derivative trades tied to stock indexes or underlying stocks. Id. There
are two potential implications for SWFs: they may seek to gain superior information through
improper means, or they will need to enter into contracts with banks in order to hedge their
beta risk. Id. See also ROBERT A. HAUGEN, MODERN INVESTMENT THEORY 1 (5th. Ed.,
Prentice Hall 2001) (arguing that modern investment theory is widely practiced, which implies
a broad dissemination of modern finance techniques). Setting up hedged positions through
futures and options contracts is an integral part of modern investment theory. Id.; cf. A
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING, supra note 30, at 174 (defining a future as a
contract to make a definite purchase of an asset at a set point in the future). An option is a
contract whereby the option holder has the right to purchase an asset at a set price and
predetermined date. A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING, supra note 30, at 295.
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SWFs are prone to the unique risks that accompany investments in
foreign denominated assets.43 SWFs enter into various contracts to
hedge against the risk of currency devaluations, interest rate
fluctuations, or simply using equity derivatives to hedge a position.44
Thus, the SWF becomes a “counterparty” to an investment contract
because it cannot hedge its positions alone.45
C. Current U.S. Regulatory Approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds
SWFs, like hedge funds, are not regulated directly. The current
approach to the regulation of SWFs and hedge funds46 is to “watch
carefully over the regulated intermediaries that lend to them.”47 This
is ineffective, however, because SWFs generally would not need to
borrow large sums of money.48 Their very existence suggests that the
43. See Williams, supra note 36 (arguing that because SWFs are diversifying away from
possible domestic contagion they will necessarily be investing in foreign denominated assets
and therefore facing additional risks because of the nature of these assets). See generally EZRA
ZASK, ED., GLOBAL INVESTMENT RISK MANAGEMENT: PROTECTING INTERNATIONAL
PORTFOLIOS AGAINST CURRENCY, INTEREST RATE, EQUITY, AND COMMODITY RISK
(McGraw-Hill 2000) (offering frameworks that an SWF may use to mitigate the myriad risks
inherent in foreign asset investment).
44. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 42, at 713–14 (stating that the use of derivatives
to mitigate an investor’s exposure to the risk associated with foreign assets can create
“substantial risks” for other market participants).
45. See A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING, supra note 30, at 95 (defining a
counterparty as “a party to a contract” and counterparty risk as “[t]he risk that either of the
parties to a contract (counterparties) will fail to honor their obligations under the contract”);
see also Norman Feder, Deconstructing Over-The-Counter Derivatives, COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
677, 722–25 (2002) (describing counterparty risk as a subset of credit risk and different from
settlement risk, although, at least in the short term, both may result in the party to the
transaction not being paid when it is time for settlement).
46. See The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage,
and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management 1 (April 1999) [hereinafter Hedge Fund
Report] (arguing that many different types of investment vehicles fall under the definition of
hedge fund). Hedge funds tend to “use leverage aggressively” and “pursue short-term
investment strategies.” Id. at 2. See also CATHERINE TURNER, INTERNATIONAL FUNDS: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THEIR ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION 88 (Elsevier Ltd. 2004)
(arguing that the first “true hedge fund” engaged in both short selling and leverage); cf. A
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING, supra note 30, at 236 (stating that leverage exists
when the principal is small compared to the risks, i.e., a hedge fund uses a small portion of its
own funds and borrows the rest to pay for a derivative position, thereby using a small amount
of assets to create a highly leveraged position).
47. See Johnson, supra note 20 (stating that these regulated intermediaries are
commercial and investment banks).
48. See Hedge Fund Report, supra note 46, at 1–2 (giving a working definition of
hedge funds and noting their prevalent use of leverage to boost overall returns on capital); see
also supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the cumulative size of SWFs and their
potential for growth). It remains to be seen if the fiduciary duties that motivate an SWF to
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countries which form them have excess cash.
The SEC would essentially be regulating investors if they were to
attempt to regulate SWFs. This notion contradicts the ethos of the
disclosure system created by the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)49
and the 1934 Act.50 The SEC does regulate certain activities by
investors, e.g., insider trading.51 The most pertinent of the
regulations affecting investors is the five percent requirement under
the 1934 Act, whereby an investor acquiring more than five percent
of a company must file a statement with the securities issuer and the
SEC.52 This statement discloses the investor’s background, identity,
residence, and the nature of the ownership, to the issuer and the
SEC. Additionally, an investor may become an issuer53 and receive

pursue higher returns will also motivate it to utilize leverage in a manner similar to hedge
funds in an effort to boost their return on capital.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 77a–aa (2008).
50. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78a–nn (2008) (providing for mandatory disclosures or
abstention from the securities market when the sale or purchase of securities meets certain
threshold requirements, such as a sale by insiders).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (prohibiting the use of manipulative and deceptive devices by
“any person”). The inclusion of the phrase “any person” allows for the prosecution of people
traditionally not considered insiders. Id. Rule 10b5-1 allows the SEC to prosecute a variety of
individuals who engage in insider trading. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). See LOSS &
SELIGMAN, supra note 42, at 855–56 (stating that rule 10b-5 of the ‘34 Act applies “whenever
any person—insider or outsider—indulges in fraudulent practices, misstatements, or half-truths
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.”). There are three arguments in favor of
preventing insider trading: Equity, Allocative Efficiency, and Property Rights. Id. at 855–59.
The Equity argument favors the proscription of trading while possessing material non-public
information due to an “integrity of the market” theory where more investors will invest in a
market that prevents insider trading. Id. at 857. The Allocative Efficiency argument is to
remove the incentive to delay information disclosure. Id. at 858. The Property Rights
argument views information as corporate property and is especially persuasive where
corporations utilize their own resources to develop that information. Id. at 859. Of the three
arguments presented by Loss and Seligman, the Public Confidence and Property Rights
arguments are the better justifications for SWF regulation. SWFs have the potential to
undermine public confidence because they may not have profit as their main motive, and they
could utilize national intelligence resources to steal proprietary information to achieve a better
return or avoid a loss. Id. at 857, 859.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (requiring persons owning more than five percent of any class
of security to notify the issuer and the SEC). The notification must include: the purchaser’s
background, identity, residence, citizenship, and the nature of the ownership. Id. §
78m(d)(1)(A). Additionally, the purchaser must state the source of the funds, whether it
intends to acquire control of the company, the number of shares that it owns, and any
contracts or arrangements it may have concerning the issuer, including puts or calls. Id. §
78m(d)(1)(B)–(D).
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(4) (defining issuer as a person who issues any security); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (requiring issuers to furnish certain information in their registration
statement when issuing securities).
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liability exposure54 by selling unregistered securities through a
company that it controls.55 Finally, a beneficial owner, who is defined
as a director, officer, or shareholder owning more than ten percent
of a §12 company, is subject to a number of different provisions of
the 1934 Act that potentially increase a beneficial owner’s liability.56
D. Testing the Sovereign Immunity of Sovereign Wealth Funds
Before delving into the international framework for regulating
SWFs, it is necessary to understand the domestic context of bringing
a foreign governmental entity under U.S. jurisdiction. In response to
litigation brought on by U.S. regulators, an SWF would likely invoke
one or all of the following three doctrines: sovereign immunity, the
act of state doctrine, and international comity.57 It is important to
understand the judicial challenges before evaluating the effectiveness
of any regulation through international agreements because it may
render the entire discussion of U.S. regulation of SWFs through
international agreements purely theoretical.
1. Restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
SEC Chairman Cox states that SWFs are not beyond U.S.
jurisdiction when violating securities laws.58 The Foreign Sovereign
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (creating a private right of action for any purchaser of a security
accompanied by a false registration statement).
55. See Blackstone Group, L.P., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 4 (June 11,
2007) (filing a registration statement stating the Chinese SWF purchased a less than ten
percent stake in the U.S. alternative asset manager, which suggests the SWF is attempting to
limit its liability exposure).
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (creating monetary liability for beneficial owners who do
not adhere to certain restrictions on the timing of sales or purchases of securities related to
those that they own).
57. See Power, supra note 9, at 2723–41 (discussing the hurdles to suing a sovereign
entity in U.S. courts in the context of sovereign debt defaults).
58. See Cox, supra note 4 (arguing that neither the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
nor international law prevents the SEC from pursuing enforcement action against SWFs). The
implication of Cox’s statement is that SWFs fall within the commercial activity exception to
sovereign immunity. Id. Additionally, he wonders whether the SEC would be able to follow its
traditional approach of soliciting a foreign securities regulator’s assistance in securing evidence
to prosecute an SWF controlled by the very government from which the SEC is requesting
assistance. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court supports Cox’s assertion in its examination of a
sovereign debt case holding, “[W]hen a foreign government acts, not as a regulator of a
market, but in the manner of a private player within it, the foreign sovereign’s actions are
‘commercial’ within the meaning of the FSIA.” Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614
(1992); see also Power, supra note 9, at 2729–32 (analyzing the application of the Weltover
decision to the sovereign debt crisis and its implication for sovereign immunity claims).
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Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), codified the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity.59 The restrictive theory states that there are
exceptions whereby a court can exercise jurisdiction over a sovereign
entity. The most widely noted restriction in FSIA limiting a foreign
state’s sovereign immunity, aside from an express waiver, is the
commercial activity and property exception.60
2. Act of state doctrine
The act of state doctrine is a judicially created rule that bars U.S.
courts from determining the validity of a foreign state’s official acts
performed within its sovereign territory even when a U.S. court
otherwise has jurisdiction.61 Unlike the case with sovereign
immunity, the rule is not waivable.62 In order to qualify as a
jurisdictional bar, the act of state doctrine requires that a U.S. court
“declare invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign performed
within its own territory.”63
3. International comity
Comity64 is similar to the act of state doctrine in that it is not a
59. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2008); see Power, supra note 9, at 2728 (positing that
FSIA starts from the premise that foreign states are immune from U.S. court jurisdiction, but
that it creates a number of exceptions, which gives rise to the “restrictive” theory).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1602; see Power, supra note 9, at 2727–28 (stating that three kinds of
activity implicate the commercial activity exception: 1) commercial activity in the United
States; 2) acts “performed in the United States in connection with commercial activity carried
on outside the United States;” and 3) acts “performed outside the United States in connection
with a commercial activity carried on outside the United States, which act has a direct effect in
the United States.”)
61. See Power, supra note 9, at 2733–34 (giving various reasons for the rule and
applications of it, e.g., the inability to grant effective relief, comity, and deference to the
executive branch in foreign affairs).
62. Id. at 2732 (stating that “[t]he most important limitation on the doctrine’s
effectiveness [as a sovereign’s defense] in collection actions is its requirement that the
challenged act of state be performed within the sovereign’s own territory”). With banking and
investment decisions made through electronic communication it is necessary to consider the
effects of an act because an analysis that an SWF official is in her country when phoning in an
order would always result in the application of the act of state doctrine. Id. at 2734.
63. See W.S. Kirkpatrick v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404–05 (1990)
(deciding that the act of state doctrine does not apply when a U.S. court does not need to pass
judgment on the validity of a foreign sovereign’s actions or where a plaintiff seeks to disregard
a governmental action). The Court suggests in dictum that the act of state doctrine would not
apply when comity or sovereign immunity do not apply to a transaction because of its
commercial nature. Id. Additionally, the Court notes that even “modern” conceptions of
international comity do not recognize sovereign immunity for commercial transactions. Id.
64. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 114 (3d Pocket ed. 2006) (defining comity as the
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rule of law,65 but comity differs in two key respects: (1) there is no
territorial limitation for the doctrine of comity, and (2) the acts
under consideration must be consistent with the laws of the United
States in order for a court to apply the doctrine.66 In essence, the
doctrine is broader than the act of state doctrine, but the restriction
that the action must be consistent with U.S. law and policy does not
offer protection to those potentially violating U.S. laws.67 An analysis
of comity within the context of sovereign debt defaults demonstrates
the limited usefulness of this doctrine to a would-be violator of U.S.
law.68
E. Sovereign Entity Status Will Not Bar the Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts
SWFs cannot shield themselves from the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts through any of the doctrines outlined above. FSIA requires a
two-step analysis to determine whether the commercial activity
exception to sovereign immunity applies in a given situation.69 The
first step is to determine whether the activity is commercial in
nature.70 SWFs engage in an activity for the benefit of the state, but
their activities are commercial in nature because they invest seeking a
profit instead of investing to protect the financial stability of the
country by maintaining liquidity.71 The second step is to determine
whether the commercial activity is conducted in the United States or
has a direct effect on the United States.72
practice among different nations involving mutual recognition of each other’s actions).
65. Power, supra note 9, at 2738; compare Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing
Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971) (describing that comity is not a rule of law,
but a judicial doctrine, which seems to imply some flexibility with its application), with First
Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762–65 (1972) (discussing the
origins of the act of state doctrine within the United States and how it is not an inflexible
doctrine).
66. See Power, supra note 9, at 2738 (applying the notion of comity to the sovereign
debt crisis and finding it did not prevent a U.S. court’s exercise of jurisdiction).
67. Id. at 2738–39.
68. See id. at 2738–41 (analyzing the utility of comity as a defense in sovereign debt
defaults and finding that the debts would be inconsistent with U.S. policy—except in a case
involving Costa Rica where the administration at the time expressed support for Costa Rica’s
policy—and thus, the defense would fail).
69. See 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2).
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (defining commercial activity and explicitly stating that the
commercial nature of activities is to be determined by the nature of its course of conduct and
not according to its stated purpose).
71. See id.
72. See Power, supra note 9, at 2728 (arguing that commercial activity in the United
States, performed in connection with the United States, and acts affecting the United States
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For an SWF investing in U.S. entities, its investments naturally
have “substantial contact” with the United States because its
investments would need to be in U.S. regulated entities to invoke
the scrutiny of a U.S. regulator.73 Thus, FSIA’s embodiment of the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity with its commercial activity
exception clearly negates the use of sovereign immunity as a bar to
U.S. court jurisdiction over SWFs.74 SWFs seek to achieve a higher
rate of return on the funds entrusted to it, and this necessarily
implicates the commercial activity exception to sovereign
immunity.75
Any potential SWF transactions of concern to U.S. regulators
would likely occur within the United States.76 Repayment of
sovereign debt, the closest analogy to the actors in an SWF
transaction, is stipulated in a certain currency with payment
designated in the country of the intermediary.77 Possible incidents of
insider trading, market manipulation, or irregularities with respect to
large block trading likely result in a nullification of the act of state
doctrine because the challenged action is not performed within the
sovereign’s territory.78 Whether there is nullification of the act of
state doctrine likely depends on a contractual analysis determining
the place of payment.79 The act of state doctrine does not apply
will result in denial of sovereign immunity); see also supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text
(discussing the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity and the conditions necessary for
piercing the sovereign veil without an express waiver).
73. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(c) (defining the United States as all territory “subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States,” which implies that all entities subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States fall within this definition).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1602; see Cox, supra note 4 (stating that neither international law nor
FSIA would render SWFs immune from U.S. jurisdiction).
75. See Williams, supra note 36 (emphasizing the difference between a central bank’s
prudential management of reserves and an SWF seeking a higher rate of return).
76. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 4 (noting that should an SWF engage in insider trading it
would adversely impact the SEC’s mission to protect U.S. investors).
77. See, e.g., Power, supra note 9, at 2735–37 (discussing the act of state doctrine and
its application to the sovereign debt crisis of the 1980s where many Latin American countries
defaulted on loans requiring intervention by the United States and other developed countries).
78. But cf. id. at 2733–34 (realizing that the act of state doctrine may apply where a
court could not grant substantial relief, but courts routinely grant awards even when there is
little chance of the party receiving it).
79. See Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 495 U.S. 660, 666–67 (leaving
undisturbed the District Court’s holding that repayment occurred where stipulated in the
contract regardless of the location of collection). The Court of Appeals suggested that the
“repayment” and “collection” are not divisible concepts, but ultimately upheld the decision
because the parties stipulated a different branch location for collection. Id. at 666–68. See also
supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for the application of
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when a foreign sovereign’s official act is not at issue.80 The possibility
of a judgment barring repayment under the act of state doctrine
increases the counterparty’s risk in a transaction.81
SWFs challenge the notion of comity for financial regulators
operating in an international context. Domestic regulators are faced
with the bottom-line issue that when “government is both the
regulator and the regulated . . . the opportunity for political
corruption increases.”82 In theory, comity calls for U.S. agencies to
recognize the executive acts of other nations, but in practice,
recognizing the executive acts of another nation may mean that the
SEC is not able to fully prevent abuses by SWFs.83
SEC Chairman Cox’s concern about the government being the
regulator and the regulated conjures up images of a monolithic
government, one which simultaneously invests and regulates
investors. However, this notion is imprecise as SWFs are specifically
established as separate government entities.84 Comity generally
prescribes that U.S. agencies do not interfere with the inner
workings of a foreign government, yet SWF participation in the U.S.
financial system constitutes action that affects U.S. markets over
which a foreign regulator exercises no control.85 SWFs could not
seek refuge under the principles of comity because their actions
logically would be violations of U.S. law if the SEC seeks to enforce

the act of state doctrine).
80. See Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 404–05 (suggesting that the act of state doctrine does
not apply in a commercial context for sovereign entities).
81. Cf. Feder, supra note 45, at 723–24 (arguing that the insolvency of a counterparty
would not necessarily cause an “out-of-pocket loss” to the “innocent party,” but it would leave
the innocent party without fulfillment of the contractual obligation it bargained for).
82. Cox, supra note 4.
83. Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 64 (including mutual recognition
of foreign executive action in its definition of comity), with Cox, supra note 4 (arguing that
the lack of a severance between the regulator and the regulated undermines the SEC’s
confidence in the ability of that regulator to do its job effectively, and thus, undermining the
concept of comity).
84. See First Nat’l City Bank, 462 U.S. at 628 (holding that these is a presumption of
separate legal status for government created entities); see also supra notes 35–38 and
accompanying text (noting that SWFs are set up as a separate entity from central banks because
they are engaging in a different style of reserve asset management, whereas a securities
regulator does not participate in the management of a country’s reserves).
85. See Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, 545 U.S. 119, 120 (2005) (holding that a
“clear statement of congressional intent” is needed before using a statutory requirement to
interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign-flag vessel). The Court holds that it is reasonable to
presume that interference with the inner workings of a state is not the intent of congressional
action, but it is Congress’ intent to regulate those actions that affect U.S. citizens. Id. at 121.
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a securities law provision. Additionally, because there is no territorial
limitation to comity, the SWF status as a foreign entity does not
provide an exception to apply these principles.86
F. Using International Agreements to Further the Mandate of
Protecting U.S. Investors
In light of the U.S. domestic limitations on SWF, this Comment
now turns to international agreements intended to protect U.S.
investors. The SEC and the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) both seek to protect U.S. investors but achieve their
objectives in different manners. The USTR attempts to prevent
foreign government interference in investments by U.S. investors.87
In contrast, the SEC protects investors from fraudulent activity by
companies operating domestically and abroad.88 Despite their
different approaches, both agencies recognize the importance of
collaborating with other countries to achieve their respective goals.89
This Comment next considers the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty and the International Organization of Securities Commissions
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding.
1. U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) were implemented in the
1960s to provide “a stable international framework for the
regulation of foreign direct investment.”90 BITs are most effective in
two key areas: (1) providing for the protection of investments, and
(2) providing a forum for the resolution of investment disputes.91
86. See Power, supra note 9, at 2738–41 (noting the limited utility of comity as a
defense when actions are inconsistent with U.S. policy).
87. See USTR, Summary of U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) Program,
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/BIT/Summary_of_US_Bilateral_Investment_Treat
y_(BIT)_Program.html [hereinafter Summary] (stating that the BIT program attempts to
provide protection to U.S. citizens investing in countries that may lack effective investor
protection).
88. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–nn (creating a disclosure system for regulated
companies in the U.S. market).
89. See generally IOSCO MOU, supra note 8 (providing a mechanism for the SEC to
request information concerning its operations that may affect participants located in other
countries).
90. See David Adair, Comment, Investors’ Rights: The Evolutionary Process of Investment
Treaties, 6 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 195, 197 (1999) (analyzing the evolution of
investment treaties and how they serve to protect the individual investor unaccustomed to the
risks of investing in foreign markets).
91. See id. at 198 (arguing that the BIT is a key improvement over the previous treaties
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BITs serve as binding statements of international law that allow
parties to seek redress from a third party arbitrator.92 The 2004 U.S.
Model BIT is the most recent version of the template the USTR uses
when it negotiates with foreign governments to create a bilateral
investment treaty.93 U.S. BITs provide investors with several benefits,
including the assurance that foreign investments receive the same
treatment as domestic investments.94
2. The International Organization of Securities Commissions’
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding
The International Organization of Securities Commissions
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (IOSCO MOU) is a
non-binding arrangement between securities regulators to encourage
information sharing concerning cross-border securities violations.95
In addition to a number of foreign financial services regulators, the
U.S. SEC and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
are parties to the IOSCO MOU.96 The signatories to the MOU
pledge to exchange information in the investigation of securities and
futures trading violations.97 The IOSCO MOU serves as an example
of regulatory equivalence rather than harmonization because the
participants have no obligation to change their securities laws.98

known as Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties (“FCNs”), which Adair regards as
the “first step in the evolutionary process of the regulation of investment”).
92. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 7, art. 24 (allowing for submission of investment
disputes to an independent arbitrator that adheres to international arbitration rules).
93. Id.
94. See Summary, supra note 87 (explaining the benefits of the BIT program). The
other five benefits are: (1) they establish limits on the expropriation of investments, (2) they
require market foreign exchange rates, (3) they “restrict the imposition of performance
requirements, such as local content targets or export quotas,” (4) they allow investors to
choose their management, and (5) they provide international arbitration for the resolution of
investment disputes. Id.
95. See IOSCO MOU, supra note 8, § 6(a) (emphasizing the parties’ intent to mutually
assist one another, but explicitly stating that the provisions are not binding).
96. Press Release, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n (CFTC), U.S.
Commodities Trading Commission Announces Participation in IOSCO Multilateral
Enforcement MOU, CFTC 4851–03 (Oct. 16, 2003).
97. See id. (outlining the broad categories of offenses it seeks to prosecute using the
IOSCO MOU). The MOU builds on 21 previous bilateral enforcement agreements signed by
the CFTC. Id.
98. See Jorge E. Vinuales, The International Regulation of Financial Conglomerates: A
Case Study of Equivalence as an Approach to Financial Integration, 37 CAL. W. INT’L L.J., 1, 4
(2006) (arguing that equivalence is a more effective approach because different regulatory
regimes can achieve similar goals without applying similar standards, thus allowing a foreign
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G. International Financial System Agreements
Broadly, the international financial system is comprised of central
banks, central monetary authorities, and the financial intermediaries
that they regulate.99 The Basel II Accord is the means by which
central bankers coordinate the regulation of financial intermediaries,
which allows those intermediaries to compete on a level playing
field.100 The IMF Articles of Agreement provide the means for
countries to coordinate their exchange rate policies and to provide
information about reserve management.101 Both of these agreements
offer potential avenues for U.S. regulation of SWFs.
1. Basel II Accord
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) created
the Basel II Accord102 to fashion a more flexible approach to
managing banks’ capital adequacy in an effort to ensure the stability

regulator to determine that an information request does not comply with its standards, whereas
harmonization would require regulatory regimes to have the same rules, thus requiring them
to honor information requests); see generally IOSCO MOU, supra note 8, at 2 (stating that the
purpose of the MOU is to ensure compliance with domestic laws). The IOSCO MOU is not a
normative document and does not provide for prescriptive changes to individual signatories’
regulatory regimes. Id.
99. See BARRY EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 75 (Princeton Univ. Press 1996) (indicating that central
banks are the lenders of last resort for the banks that they regulate).
100. See generally Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework 2 (June
2004) [hereinafter Basel II Accord] (offering a greatly revised capital adequacy standard so that
internationally active banks face the same regulatory standards instead of each country dictating
its own reserve requirements to the banks it regulates).
101. IMF Articles, supra note 12.
102. See BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (BIS), THE BIS IN PROFILE (Sept.
2007), available at http://www.bis.org/about/profile.pdf. (explaining that the BIS is a group
of 55 central bankers and monetary supervisors, which have representation and voting at its
General Meetings). The “Group of Ten” countries established the BCBS in the aftermath of a
banking crisis in 1974. Id. See also A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING, supra note 30,
at 189–90 (stating that the group originally began as a group of lenders for the IMF); BCBS,
HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERSHIP, (Jan. 2007), available at
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm [hereinafter HISTORY]. Currently, it has thirteen
members and is one of the five main committees of the BIS. Id. See also BIS, MONETARY AND
FINANCIAL STABILITY–OVERVIEW, available at http://www.bis.org/stability.htm (describing
the breakdown of the committees housed at BIS). While the BCBS is not a formal supervisory
authority, it recommends standards and guidelines in an effort to have those implemented by
the individual authorities. Id. See also HISTORY, supra (suggesting that it does not possess any
authority is a bit of a misstatement because its members do have the authority in many
instances to impose its decisions).
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of the international banking system while not creating any
competitive disadvantage for internationally active banks.103 The
Basel II Accord represents the efforts of its central bank and
monetary authority members who utilize a soft law approach to
promulgate their “principles and codes of conduct and best
practices.”104 Individual members of the BCBS implement the
measures included in the Basel II Accord.105 The Accord uses a
“Three Pillar” system of protecting the international banking system
from various risks by assuring that internationally active banks and
their holding companies have reserved enough capital in case these
risks materialize.106 The Three Pillars are Minimum Capital
Requirements, Supervisory Review Process, and Market Discipline.107
The amount of capital a bank must set aside for a particular
transaction depends upon with whom it is interacting, or, in other
words, how big a capital charge a bank must take.108
The key to the First Pillar, Minimum Capital Requirements, of
the Basel II Accord is the credit assessment of the entities with which
banks interact. An SWF’s potential classification under the Basel II
103. See generally Basel II Accord, supra note 100 (laying out its mandate of maintaining
stability and competitive equality). The prevention of regulatory arbitrage and the force of the
market may not allow regulators to make substantial changes in the BCBS’ Basel II Accord. See
also U.S. Final Rule, supra note 12 (implementing the Basel II Accord in the United States,
and noting that U.S. commentators reacted against changes from the BCBS proposals because
the changes would likely impose higher costs, create competitiveness issues, and increase
regulatory burden without improving overall safety and soundness).
104. Joseph J. Norton, An Interim Filling the Gap in Multilateral, Regional, and
Domestic Hard Law Deficiencies Respecting Financial Services within the Americas, 12 LAW &
BUS. REV. AM. 153, 159 (2006) (arguing that the soft law process may not work for other
financial regulator “standard-setters” like the IOSCO MOU signatories).
105. Basel II Accord, supra note 100, at 1; see U.S. Final Rule, supra note 12, at 1
(stating that four agencies adopted the Basel II Accord in the United States due to their
overlapping regulatory functions with respect to banking). These agencies are the Office of the
Comptroller of the Treasury, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Id.
106. See Basel II Accord, supra note 100, passim (describing the composition and
utilization of the three pillar system as an effort to provide a more efficient capital adequacy
requirement). Id. at 6.
107. Id. at 6. The pillars are mutually supportive as the disclosures under the third pillar
“effectively complement” the other two pillars by enforcing market discipline. Id. at 3. One of
the keys to this approach is disclosure by banks of risks on their balance sheets. Id. at 6.
108. See id. at 15–47 (outlining the Standardised [sic] Approach to measuring credit
risk). The credit assessment determines how much risk weight must be applied to claims on
various types of entities. Id. The risk weight can range from 20% to 150% depending on the
credit assessment of the borrower. Id. When a party has a better credit assessment the bank sets
aside less capital and, therefore, can finance more deals because it is taking a smaller capital
charge. Id.
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Accord is as a Public Sector Entity (PSE).109 Whether to give the
SWF the same credit assessment as the sovereign, or as a normal
commercial entity, is at the bank’s discretion.110 SWFs engaging in
atypical transactions when compared to the average sovereign
borrower, or institutional investor, complicate the decision for
banks.111
2. The IMF Articles of Agreement and disclosure requirements
concerning foreign exchange reserves
In addition to the Basel II Accord, the IMF is an organization
that monitors the management of reserve assets by its members.
Seemingly, it offers the primary mechanism for regulation of SWFs
because they manage reserve assets. The IMF Articles of Agreement
govern IMF operations and constitute a non-self-executing treaty in
the sense that they do not create a private right of action.112 Rather,
they create a horizontal relationship between states.113
The framers of the IMF Articles of Agreement designed them for
the post World War II exchange rate system with the U.S. dollar as
the centerpiece of the system.114 Indeed, the use of the dollar as the
centerpiece of the system led in part to the holdings of excess
109. Cf. id. at 15–16 (revealing that SWFs could be accorded the same treatment as the
sovereign or the central bank, or because of their commercial nature could be treated as a
normal commercial enterprise). This is a discretionary decision by the bank, and the bank
would need to examine the specific institutional arrangement of the SWF and its relationship
to the central bank. Id. For example, if the SWF were guaranteed a certain share of profits per
year from a country’s mineral resource production, then this may qualify as a specific revenue
raising power, and allow the bank to more easily justify giving the SWF the same credit
assessment as the sovereign or central bank. Id.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Hildebrand, supra note 27 (demonstrating that SWFs do not need to raise
funds; they need to invest funds).
112. See Sloss & Jinks, U.S. Chapter (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript on file with
author) (stating that creating a private right of action is one of the three understandings of a
non-self-executing treaty, and the other two are it “lacks the force of law, or that it is not
judicially enforceable”); see also Em Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg., 473 F.3d 463, 482–83 (2d Cir.
2007) (describing that the powers exercised under the IMF Articles of Agreement are
sovereign in nature). Only sovereign states can sign the treaty and avail themselves of its
resources. Id.
113. See Sloss & Jinks, supra note 112, at 6 (noting that the other two relationships are
“vertical relationships between states and private parties, and private transactions between
private parties.”). Thus, it makes sense that treaties predicated on horizontal relationships
would be non-self-executing because they do not create private rights of action. Id.
114. See generally EICHENGREEN, supra note 99, at 93–135 (describing how the British
members of the Bretton Woods Conference did not want the dollar to be the centerpiece, but
relented in their demands).
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reserves in dollar-denominated assets.115 It is in these assets that
SWFs are now investing.116 The Articles of Agreement require that
member states collaborate on exchange rate policy, which implicates
the management of reserve assets, and that they share information
regarding reserve assets.117
III. ANALYSIS
SWFs create multiple risk points within the U.S. financial system.
Their status as a commercial entity prevents them from raising
jurisdictional bars in the U.S. courts. However, current international
agreements do not offer an effective means of regulating SWFs. The
IOSCO MOU and the U.S. Model BIT are ineffective means of
potential regulation and indeed could hinder effective regulation.
Additionally, parties to these agreements generally do not control
SWFs.118 Other international agreements that focus on the
international financial system more broadly are equally ineffective.
The structure of the Basel II Accord limits its usefulness, and
political concerns generally prevent unilateral changes during its
implementation.119 Furthermore, it is unlikely that the Federal
Reserve can indirectly regulate SWFs via the Basel II Accord. Finally,
the IMF Articles of Agreement are ill-equipped to deal with the
realities of the post World War II financial system.120
A. The SEC Cannot Effectively Regulate Sovereign Wealth Funds by
Using the U.S. Model BIT or the IOSCO MOU
The current form of U.S. BITs (as epitomized by the U.S.
Model BIT)121 is ill-prepared to deal with the risks posed by SWFs.
115. See generally id. (giving a history of the international monetary system and placing in
context the role of the U.S. dollar as the principal reserve asset in the post World War II
monetary system).
116. See generally supra text accompanying note 29.
117. See generally IMF Articles, supra note 12 (providing the general obligations of
members to coordinate on exchange rate policy and to manage their reserve assets in line with
Articles of Agreement).
118. See Appendices A–C (demonstrating very little overlap between the countries that
have SWFs and the countries that are party to the IOSCO MOU or have a BIT in force with
the United States).
119. See infra Part III.B (highlighting the challenges to making unilateral changes during
implementation of the Basel II Accord by the United States).
120. See infra Part III.C (arguing that the IMF Articles of Agreement are a post World
War II relic).
121. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 7.
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The focus of BITs is protecting covered investments from
expropriation by a foreign government,122 giving most-favorednation (MFN) treatment to the other contracting party’s investors,123
guaranteeing repatriation of profits,124 and settling disputes that
cannot be resolved through consultation and negotiation.125
Additionally, the U.S. Model BIT provides that foreign investors
covered under the treaty shall be accorded national treatment in the
establishment of investments.126 These provisions may actually work
against a U.S. regulator seeking to pursue legal action or impose
restrictions on the actions of an SWF, for the reasons described
below.127
First, an SWF is defined as an enterprise according to the U.S.
Model BIT;128 it is treated the same as any other U.S. enterprise,
meaning that a U.S. regulator may not single out SWFs for any
specialized regulation without facing a potential investment
dispute.129 Current U.S. regulation to the analogous hedge fund is a
hands-off approach.130 The implication of national treatment is that
U.S. regulators would need to treat SWFs in the same manner as
hedge funds.131 U.S. regulators may circumvent the national
treatment of foreign investors because the U.S. Model BIT permits
122. Id. art. 6.
123. Id. art. 4.
124. Id. art.7.
125. Id. art. 24; see Calvin A. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment:
Foreign Direct Investment through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1,
8–9 (2005) (describing these as the typical key provisions of BITs).
126. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 7, art. 3, ¶ 1–3 (stating that the favorable treatment
accorded to foreign investors needs to be the same as accorded to national investors and that
those investors can either be juridical or natural persons).
127. See Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 125, at 1 (stating that BITs aim to protect
investors from discriminatory regulation).
128. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 7, art. 1 (defining an enterprise as either privately or
governmentally owned, and organized for profit or not). This wide ranging definition captures
the activities of SWFs. Id.
129. Compare id. arts. 3–5 (detailing the U.S. obligations as a host party, which include
providing national treatment and a minimum standard of “fair and equitable treatment”), with
id. art. 24 (providing for an aggrieved party to submit a claim to arbitration if articles three
through ten are breached).
130. See Hedge Fund Report, supra note 46, at 1–2 (describing the variance of hedge
fund activity, thus making it difficult to compare SWF activity to hedge fund activity). Note
that the effectiveness of this approach is limited by the difference in SWF behavior as compared
to hedge funds because hedge funds tend to aggressively use leverage. Id.; see also supra notes
46–48 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. approach for hedge fund regulation).
131. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 7, art. 3(2) (requiring the same treatment for
foreign investors that the United States accords to U.S. investors, which includes hedge funds).
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the prevention of transfers of capital related to investments so long as
they apply the law in an “equitable, non-discriminatory, and good
faith” manner.132 The application of certain domestic laws may be
allowed under the U.S. Model BIT, but that does not prevent an
SWF from seeking arbitration.133 Finally, the U.S. Model BIT
provides no impetus for foreign regulators to aid U.S. regulators by
providing information regarding SWF activities.134
The IOSCO MOU seems to be the SEC’s best option for
pursuing an SWF and forcing SWF disclosures, but the MOU lacks
effectiveness for two reasons: (1) it does not create a legally binding
obligation,135 and (2) a foreign regulator can deny a request for
assistance on the grounds of an essential national interest.136 These
deficiencies are understandable when considered within the context
of the harmonization versus equivalence debate.137 Harmonization
requires two countries to have the same rules to achieve the same
goals whereas equivalence allows for different rules to achieve the
same goals. Forcing an information exchange may contradict a
country’s regulatory regime preference.138 The regulatory regime
132. Id. art. 7, ¶ 4. The U.S. Model BIT allows the United States to prevent the transfer
of dividends or other investment returns to SWFs that violate “laws relating to:
(a) bankruptcy, insolvency, or the protection of the rights of creditors;
(b) issuing, trading, or dealing in securities, futures, options, or derivatives;
(c) criminal or penal offenses;
(d) financial reporting or record keeping of transfers when necessary to assist law
enforcement or financial regulatory authorities; or
(e) ensuring compliance with orders or judgments in judicial or administrative
proceedings.”
Id.
133. Id. art. 24.
134. Id. arts. 18–19 (allowing for the denial of information request due to “essential
security interests,” or on the less onerous ground that it may “prejudice the legitimate
commercial interest” of a public enterprise).
135. See IOSCO MOU, supra note 8, § 6(a) (stating as a general principle that the MOU
does not supersede domestic laws).
136. See id. § 6(e)(iv) (recognizing the importance of information sharing, but
eviscerating its effectiveness by allowing countries to evade a request on the basis of public or
essential national interest).
137. See Vinuales, supra 98, at 4 (noting that the two concepts are not mutually exclusive
as the U.S.-E.U. approach to the harmonization of accounting standards started with
equivalence). The two are mutually exclusive, however, because equivalence ceases to exist
when there is regulatory harmonization. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 98.
138. See Vinuales, supra note 98, at 56–57 (noting that the Swiss authorities pay lip
service to information exchanged concerning financial conglomerates, but stringent legal
hurdles remain before a Swiss authority can relay information to a foreign regulator even when
an agreement such as the IOSCO MOU is in place).
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preference is difficult to untangle from a country’s political or
strategic motives when deciding to share information about an
SWF’s investment activities.139 Without the legal imperative, it would
be difficult to elicit a foreign regulator’s support for U.S. regulation
of that country’s SWF.140
B. Dashed Hopes for Indirect Regulation by the Federal Reserve
Through Basel II Implementation
SWFs invest the excess reserves of their home countries.141 It is
unlikely that they will participate in the financial system in the same
manner as sovereign debt borrowers.142 U.S. regulators can
promulgate regulations forcing financial intermediaries to apply
pressure to SWFs by requiring banks to take a higher capital charge
for their interactions with SWFs.143 The typical interaction between
an SWF and an internationally active bank is likely to be an offbalance sheet item144 for the bank involving counterparty risk, to
which the BASEL II Accord does not apply a specific risk

139. See IOSCO MOU, supra note 8 § 6(e)(iv) (allowing for the rejection of information
requests based on national security provides an opportunity for rejecting the request based on
nebulous reasoning).
140. See Cox, supra note 4 (questioning the resolve of governments to cooperate with a
fraud investigation when the target of the fraud is an SWF controlled by the same
government). Compare Appendix A (listing the major SWFs in existence), with Appendix B
(listing the signatories to the IOSCO MOU). Note that there is very little overlap between the
two lists, thus the effectiveness of the IOSCO MOU is limited as a tool to regulate SWFs. Id.
141. See supra notes 25–39 and accompanying text (laying out the essential features of
the SWF).
142. Cf. Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International
Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 711, 711 (2007) (noting that debt instruments are a popular
means for governments to raise funds). Governments that have the resources to set up an SWF
would be less likely to interact with internationally active banks with respect to debt issuance as
the government is not seeking to raise funds, but to invest its excess reserves. Id.
143. Compare U.S. Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66–69 (noting the objections of many
commentators to proposed changes in the Final Rule for implementation of the Basel II
Accord including claims that the changes would leave U.S. regulated banks at a competitive
disadvantage compared to foreign regulated banks), with discussion supra notes 102–08 and
accompanying text (discussing the implementation of Basel II Accord in the United States and
elsewhere through a soft law approach). The soft law nature of the Basel II Accord allows
countries to make changes to the rules as they implement them. Id.
144. See A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING, supra note 30, at 290 (defining an
off-balance sheet instrument as a derivative transaction that a bank does not have to disclose on
its balance sheet, which allows banks to hide their exposure to SWF risks). Derivatives are
financial instruments with their price determined by underlying financial instrument and are
useful for hedging risk. Id. at 113.
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weighting.145
A unilateral move by U.S. banking regulators to require banks
dealing with SWFs to take a higher capital charge could result in a
drift from SWFs utilizing U.S. regulated banks, resulting in less
income for those banks.146 Thus, unilaterally imposing a higher
capital charge leaves U.S. regulated banks at a competitive
disadvantage to non-U.S. regulated banks.147 Furthermore, the
higher capital charge does not necessarily prevent SWFs from dealing
with a non-U.S. regulated subsidiary of a U.S. regulated bank.148
From a legal standpoint, U.S. banking regulators are free to change
the requirements of the Basel
II Accord because its provisions are non-binding.149 From a
practical standpoint, with the institutional momentum of the Basel II
Accords, it is not a viable option for U.S. regulators to make
substantive changes during the implementation of the Basel
Accords.150
145. See Basel II Accord, supra note 100, at 22 (“Counterparty risk weightings for OTC
derivative transactions will not be subject to any specific ceiling.”). There are provisions for
dealing with short-term commitments such as letters of credit collateralized by the underlying
shipment, repo-style transactions with other banks, etc. Id. The Basel II Accord, however,
deferred a decision on how to handle counterparty credit risk with respect to unsettled
securities and foreign exchange transactions, and left it to the banks to decide how to mitigate
their credit exposure in this area. Id.
146. See U.S. Final Rule, supra note 12, at 41–42 (stating that foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. banks can avail themselves of “host jurisdiction definition[s] of default for retail
exposures of the foreign subsidiary in that jurisdiction . . . “); see also Joel P. Trachtman,
Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction in International Securities Regulation, in
REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 290–91 (Daniel C. Esty &
Damien Geradin, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (arguing that allowing foreign subsidiaries to
choose host jurisdiction regulation would create a situation “imposing no substantive
obligations” on issuers because they would move to seemingly regulation-free states).
147. See U.S. Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66–69 (noting the concerns of commentators
reacting to the proposal to change aspects of the U.S. Final Rule away from the requirements
set forth in the Basel II Accord, and indicating that it would leave U.S. regulated banks at a
competitive disadvantage when compared to non-U.S. regulated banks).
148. Cf. id. at 41–42 (differentiating between the approach for the wholesale transaction
category, which cover SWFs, and retail transactions where the U.S. banking regulators
explicitly note that foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-regulated financial institutions may follow their
home country’s rules for allocating risk assessments to counterparties).
149. See Lawrence C. Lee, Integration of International Banking Supervisory Standards: A
Blueprint for the Taiwanese Banking System, 19 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 455, 460 (2000)
(commenting that the purpose of the Basel Accords is not to create legally binding agreements
and that in order for the agreements to be effective, they are dependent upon national-level
implementation and enforcement).
150. Id. at 460–61 (suggesting that the Basel Accords should apply to all financial
intermediaries). It is arguable that because of the interconnectedness of the financial system the
Basel Accords do apply to most if not all of the financial institutions in some respect. Id.
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C. The IMF Articles of Agreement -- A False Panacea
There is a tension between applying the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity and utilizing the IMF Articles of Agreement to
regulate SWFs. The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity treats
the government entity as a commercial actor, while the non-selfexecution doctrine implies that actors under the IMF Articles of
Agreement are sovereign entities.151 Distinguishing between a
sovereign’s actions and a sovereign’s independently created agency is
difficult, especially in the case of SWFs.152 SWFs invest a country’s
excess reserves153 but claim to seek a profit.154 This mixture of
resources and motives leads to their muddled status with respect to
the IMF Articles of Agreement. FSIA defines SWFs as commercial
actors stripped of their sovereign status, yet the IMF Articles of
Agreement cover sovereign actions, which seemingly makes these
two views irreconcilable.155
IMF members are obligated to collaborate on policies
concerning reserve assets as seen in Article VIII, section seven.156
This would seemingly require members to collaborate on matters
concerning SWFs, but the thrust of the Articles of Agreement is to
promote international liquidity by making the Special Drawing Right
(SDR) the principal reserve asset, which the IMF framers assumed
would replace the U.S. dollar’s position in the world today.157 Article
8, section seven seeks to prevent the use of capital controls that harm
151. Compare Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992) (holding that the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity results in the classification of some government
entities as commercial actors), with Em Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg., 473 F.3d 463, 482–83 (2d Cir.
2007) (holding that the powers under the IMF Articles of Agreement, i.e., reserves
management, are sovereign in nature).
152. Cf. Paul L. Lee, Central Banks and Sovereign Immunity, 41 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 327, 364 (noting that a series of appellate cases demonstrated an “aversion to
overriding the presumption of independent status for separate corporate agencies or
instrumentalities.”).
153. See Em Ltd., 473 F.3d at 482–83 (holding that managing reserves is sovereign in
nature).
154. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text (explaining the fiduciary duty of
SWFs and the need to maximize the r/r equation).
155. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (piercing the sovereign veil for the commercial activities
of foreign states).
156. See IMF Articles, supra note 12, art. VIII, § 7 (including the word “and” in
between the provision for collaborating with respect to reserve asset management and the
promotion of the SDR as the principal reserve asset provision, thus creating a dual obligation).
157. Id.; see generally EICHENGREEN, supra note 99 (arguing the momentum of the U.S.
dollar prevented the SDR from assuming the U.S. dollar’s place in the international monetary
system).
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international liquidity regardless of the general obligation found in
this section to collaborate regarding exchange rate policy.158
Additionally, the goal of making the SDR the principal reserve asset
makes it clear that Article VIII, section seven intends to promote
collaboration with respect to some reserve asset policies but not at
the expense of harming international liquidity.159
Reporting measures defined by Article VIII, section five are
inadequate because they only require a broad view of a country’s
investment activities. Section five governs the furnishing of
information because not all countries have accepted the use of the
SDR as a principal reserve asset.160 Subsection VII requires disclosure
of a country’s international investment position, but this is a
macroeconomic measure and does not provide specifics about a
country’s individual investment decisions.161 Other provisions of
section five require members to provide similar macroeconomic
data.162 Most members of the IMF currently furnish such data but
are not required to furnish information about the investments made
by SWFs.163 Nominally, the IMF Articles of Agreement offer false
hope as a means to regulate SWFs by mandating disclosures. The
IMF Articles of Agreement did not contemplate a post World War II
financial system where countries not only hold reserve assets but
utilize them for investment purposes.

158. See IMF Articles, supra note 12, art. VIII, § 7 (stating that the aim of the mutual
collaboration is to promote international liquidity and not specifically to monitor member’s
reserve asset management).
159. See id. (demonstrating that liquidity is the primary goal, which is understandable in a
post World War II era where concern focused on capital and current account controls, and not
investment by states).
160. Id. art. VIII, § 5 (requiring member countries to provide information concerning
gold and foreign exchange holdings, which would be unnecessary if countries only held SDRs
as reserve assets).
161. Id. art. VIII, § 5(vii); see APPLEYARD ET AL., supra note 6, at 459–63 (giving an
overview of the international investment position of countries and stating that it is a
macroeconomic indicator that does not provide specific information on micro-level
management of reserves).
162. See generally IMF Articles, supra note 12, art. VIII, § 5 (describing the various
responsibilities of member governments under the treaty, and conspicuously absent is any
provision where a member would need to provide specific data concerning its investment
position).
163. See IMF, The Data: Coverage, Periodicity, and Timeliness, http://dsbb.imf.org/
Applications/web/sddsdatadimensions/ (last visited Sep. 29, 2008)(providing the categories
of statistics that governments provide under the Special Data Dissemination Standard, which
does not require countries to provide the type of data necessary to reduce transparency
concerns about SWFs).
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

Although the current structure is flawed, the best approach to
regulating SWFs is through adjustments to the existing framework.
The international agreements outlined above offer little help to U.S.
regulators concerned with SWF activity affecting the United States.
Either the agreements do not include the necessary participants to
make them useful, or they lack the provisions to make them
effective.164 Even those agreements that are non-binding prevent the
United States from unilaterally making changes to them.165 Making
changes to the existing framework is more time-effective whereas
negotiating a multilateral investment framework would be very timeintensive. This Comment offers recommendations for changes to the
U.S. Model BIT, including modification to disclosure requirements,
and to the Basel Capital Adequacy Standards and the IMF Articles of
Agreement.
A. Recommendations for the U.S. Model BIT
The U.S. Model BIT offers the United States the best hope for
regulating SWFs. Currently, its provisions block attempts to single
out an SWF for regulation separate from that which governs a
domestic entity. Utilizing the U.S. Model BIT remains a
hypothetical approach to SWF regulation because there are no
countries with SWFs that have agreed to a U.S. BIT.166 This
approach would require negotiation of a treaty and would allow the
other party to request concessions from the U.S. government.
1. Include information sharing provisions similar in scope to the
IOSCO MOU
Including a package of provisions similar to the IOSCO MOU in
the U.S. Model BIT could allow the United States to bind other
countries to provide information on SWFs when requested by U.S.
regulators.167 The scope of the requirement to provide information
164. Compare Appendix A (listing the countries that control SWFs), with Appendix B
(providing scant overlap with Appendix A), and Appendix C (presenting the ineffectiveness of
the BIT as a tool for SWF).
165. See supra notes and accompanying text 146–150 (elucidating the challenges of
unilaterally changing the Basel II Accord during U.S. implementation).
166. See Appendix C (demonstrating the need to negotiate with other countries because
the current U.S. BITs are with countries that do not have SWFs).
167. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text (determining the effectiveness of the
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would need to include a detailed accounting of foreign investments
in the United States. This requirement would need to be binding,
which is the major drawback with respect to the IOSCO MOU.168
2. Single out government investment vehicles
Currently, the MFN and national treatment of countries allow
for government entities that engage in commercial activities to
receive the same treatment as a publicly held company.169 The
United States should recognize that SWFs pose greater risks than the
average foreign investor does and should single out SWFs in the U.S.
Model BIT.170 Information requests about SWFs should not be
denied because of national security. They are operating in a
commercial sphere and should be treated accordingly.171 The USTR
should probably be prepared to accept some level of hedge fund
regulation as a compromise to their demands for the U.S. Model
BIT to single out SWFs. By doing so, the USTR could maintain the
overall goal of BITs to provide equal protection of foreign and
domestic investors.
B. Modification of the Basel Capital Adequacy Standards
The next revision to the Basel Capital Adequacy Standards
should include provisions that recognize SWFs as a separate entity
from the central bank and accord them different treatment.
Currently banks can elect to treat SWFs as having the same
creditworthiness172 as the central bank.173 Allowing banks to elect
IOSCO MOU with respect to the regulation of SWFs). But see IOSCO MOU, supra note 8, at
§ 6(a) (showing the MOU could only serve as a starting point because its language is intended
to be non-binding and allow for a country to deny an information request based on national
interest). Allowing a country to deny an information request in a revised BIT context would
undermine its effectiveness and render it as useless in the context of regulating SWFs as the
IOSCO MOU. See id.
168. See IOSCO MOU, supra note 8, § 6(a) (stating that the MOU is non-binding).
169. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 7, arts. 3–4 (requiring similar treatment between
foreign and domestic investors).
170. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (detailing the comparative size of SWFs).
171. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (removing sovereign immunity for commercial activities by
sovereign actors).
172. See A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING, supra note 30, at 100 (defining
creditworthiness as a measure of an entity’s ability to repay debt, which in the case of SWFs
should be relatively high considering they are flush with cash and other highly liquid
instruments).
173. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text (showing the discretion given to
banks concerning SWFs).
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how they treat SWFs with respect to the capital charge removes any
leverage that a regulator could potentially apply to financial
intermediaries in hopes of garnering disclosures about SWFs’
investment decisions. The United States cannot unilaterally change
the regulations for the banks it manages because an SWF could
simply utilize a foreign subsidiary of the same bank over which the
United States does not have control.174 As such, capital adequacy
standards should be modified for financial intermediaries dealing
with SWFs that do not adhere to a specified level of transparency.
C. Specific Changes for the IMF Articles of Agreement and a Plan for
Their Implementation
In addition to the IMF developing a set of best practices for
SWFs,175 making simple changes to the IMF Articles of Agreement
could make it easier to obtain information about SWFs. First, adding
“individual investment positions”176 as a category of reporting to
Article VIII, § 5(a)(i) would make this provision useful for those
seeking more transparency from SWFs.177 Second, adding “with the
exception of government sponsored investment vehicles”178 to the
second line of Article VIII, § 5(b) would add the obligation that
members report data with sufficiency to cover SWFs.179
The United States and Western Europe could entice other IMF
members to accept the changes in exchange for enhanced voting
174. See discussion supra Part III.B (analyzing the issues concerning unilateral changes to
the Basel II Accord by the United States).
175. See Truman, supra note 33, at 9 (stating that the IMF or World Bank could wait for
governments to enlist their assistance, or they could take the initiative and establish a code of
best practices); see also Clay Lowery, Acting Under Secretary for International Affairs, U.S.
Treasury, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s Conference on the Asian
Financial Crisis Revisited: Sovereign Wealth Funds and the International Financial System
(June 21, 2007), available at http://www.frbsf.org/banking/asiasource/events/2007/
0706/papers/lowery.pdf (calling for the IMF and World Bank to lead with a set of best
practices, but also stating that there is a need to review foreign direct investment to protect
national security without creating undue barriers).
176. The revised provision would read as follows: “i) Official holdings at home and
abroad of (1) gold, (2) foreign exchange, and (3) individual investment positions.”
177. IMF Articles, supra note 12, art. VIII, § 5; see Truman, supra note 33, at 8
(discussing the IMF’s special data dissemination standard (SDDS), which provides for a greater
detail of reserve composition reporting). Many countries go beyond the minimum standards of
SDDS and report their reserve management strategies as part of their SDDS reports. Id.
178. The revised provision would read as follows: “b) Members shall be under no
obligation to furnish information in such detail that the affairs of individuals or corporations
are disclosed with the exception of government sponsored investment vehicles.”
179. IMF Articles, supra note 12, art. VIII, § 5.
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rights.180 Currently, control of the IMF is concentrated in those
Western powers.181 However, the countries controlling the IMF
generally do not have SWFs. In contrast, countries with a
disproportionately small share of voting rights control many SWFs.
By exchanging SWF disclosure for enhanced voting rights, the IMF
can become more democratic and create a relevant role for itself in
the 21st century.182
V. CONCLUSION
The SEC and other U.S. regulators lack the tools to effectively
regulate SWFs. Since SWFs are treated as investors, they enjoy many
of the benefits granted to others in their class. Most of the SEC’s
tools are framed around protecting investors rather than regulating
them. The disclosure regime of the SEC is focused on issuers and
certain insiders. Thus far, SWFs have not fallen into either of these
categories because they have elected not to appoint directors, have
remained under the 10% threshold of ownership after which an
investor must file a disclosure with the SEC as a beneficial owner,
and have not become issuers.
As demonstrated, the international agreements to which the
United States is a party, offer little relief from the shortcomings of
the domestic system. They provide no additional means of forcing
disclosure from SWFs. Additionally, the pursuit of securities law
violators in an international context necessarily predicates the
cooperation of foreign regulators, though this may be easier said
than done when the arm’s length distance between the regulator and
the regulated breaks down. Understanding the legal context of
regulating SWFs supports the conclusion that the discussion
surrounding regulation has less to do with the law and more to do
with politics.

180. Cf. APPLEYARD ET AL., supra note 6, at 749 (calling for greater transparency of IMF
decision making).
181. Id.
182. Id.
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APPENDIX A:
COUNTRIES WITH SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS183
Australia
Brunei
Canada (Alberta)
China
Kuwait
Libya
Micronesia
Norway
Qatar
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
South Korea
United Arab Emirates
United States (Alaska)

183. Compiled from: HANNESSON, supra note 35; Hildebrand, supra note 27; The
World’s Most Expensive Club, supra note 15.
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APPENDIX B:
IOSCO MOU SIGNATORIES184
Alberta Securities Commission (SC), Alberta
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), Australia
Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB), Bahrain, Kingdom of
Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission, Belgium
Bermuda Monetary Authority, Bermuda
British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC), British Columbia
Financial Services Commission of the British Virgin Islands, British
Virgin Islands
China Securities Regulatory Commission, China
Czech National Bank, Czech Republic
Denmark Financial Supervisory Authority (Finanstilsynet), Denmark
Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA), Dubai
Financial Supervision Authority, Finland
Autorité des marchés financiers, France
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungaufsicht (BAFin), Germany
Capital Market Commission (CMC), Greece
Securities and Futures Commission, Hong Kong
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, Hungary
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), India
Financial Supervision Commission, Isle of Man
Israel Securities Authority (ISA), Israel
Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa, Italy
Financial Services Agency (FSA), Japan
Jersey Financial Services Commission (FSC), Jersey
Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), Jordan
Lithuanian Securities Commission, Lithuania
Commission de surveillance du secteur financier of Luxembourg,
Luxembourg
Securities Commission of Malaysia, Malaysia
Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA), Malta
Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV), Mexico
Conseil déontologique des valeurs mobilières (CDVM), Morocco
The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM),
Netherlands, The
184. Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns [IOSCO] Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding
Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (May 2002) app.
A, available at http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section=mou_siglist.
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Securities Commission of New Zealand (SC), New Zealand
Securities and Exchange Commission of Nigeria (NSEC), Nigeria
The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (Kredittilsynet),
Norway
Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), Ontario
Polish Securities and Exchange Commission (PSEC), Poland
Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM), Portugal
Autorité des Marchés Financiers, Québec
Monetary Authority of Singapore, Singapore
The National Bank of Slovakia, Slovak Republic
Financial Services Board (FSB), South Africa
Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV), Spain
Securities and Exchange Commission, Sri Lanka
Capital Markets Board (CMB), Turkey
Financial Services Authority (FSA), United Kingdom
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), United States
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), United States
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APPENDIX C:
COUNTRIES WITH BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES WITH THE
UNITED STATES185
Albania
Argentina
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Bulgaria
Cameroon
Congo, Democratic Republic of
(Kinshasa)
Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville)
Croatia
Czech Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
Estonia
Georgia
Grenada
Honduras

Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Panama
Romania
Senegal
Slovakia
Sri Lanka
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Ukraine
Uruguay

185. Trade Compliance Center, Bilateral Investment Treaties Currently in Force as of
Feb. 2, 2009, http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral_Investment_Treaties/
index.asp.
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